Iranian “election”, who participated and why?

The election in Iran to elect members of the Majlis (the parliament) and the Majlis-e Khobregan (the Assembly of Experts) happened, and the same boring story. On the one hand, jubilation that “reform” advanced a step forward, in order to prepare to retreat two steps afterwards, and, on the other camp, the hopeless show of hope that 40 or 50 percent of eligible voters have boycotted the “election”, that this is the silent drive of the revolution, and that we must wait for our day to come. Of course, this is sometimes combined with deep and bitter rage towards the millions who went to polling stations.
            However, more than jubilation and outrage, we must know who and for what ends participate in this game.
            I think this general classification may provide an outline for the discussion:1)      The sections affiliated to the ruling system
A very large bureaucratic and military apparatus exists in Iran that consists of millions. This bureaucratic and military apparatus includes not only the obviously ideological and political appearance and function – such as different foundations and institutes that are under the direct supervision of the Supreme Leader – but also a large number of high-ranking and middle-ranking employees in state departments and ministries. Everybody knows a large number of such employees have provided with these offices and pays only because of their adherence to certain political gangs and clans and chieftains. This section also includes both the so-called hardliners and reformers who have been busied with dividing power among themselves in the last thirty years. This section participates in the election consciously and based on a short-term or middle-term political program.
2)      The sections close to the ruling system
These sections participate in the election to pursue their interests. The election is not a mere sphere of illusion for them. Though they don’t have an organic representative in the ruling system but they approach this or that faction to guarantee their own interests. This section can be divided into two sub-suctions:a)      The traditional petit-bourgeoisie and peasantry
This sections though have suffered economic crushing pressure owing to sanctions but they have never stopped to play the reactionary role of pawns of rulers. What links these sections to the rulers is their desire for conserving traditional social values in the sphere of private and family life and the continuation of the absolute domination of man over woman and children. The reactionary anti-Western rhetoric of the Iranian clergy whose criticism of Imperialism is mostly about their complaints about immorality, nudity, and waning family values, is a good ideological shelter for this section. This is an important factor in the Iranian society that is frequently neglected.
b)      Iranian nouveau riche
The Iranian bourgeoisie that has shaped a relatively vast class after the end of Iran-Iraq war in comparison to the pre-revolutionary era is in a brisk process of finding allies in the ruling system because it still lacks an organic representative. This section wishes the rulers to slacken curb on the political domain and giving them a chance to occupy a seat among rulers. This section includes the celebrities, a part of intelligentsia and some academics. These sections have been given a good share of the profit but political and ideological requirements of rulers that sometimes obstruct the normal accumulation of capital is a source of worry.
3)      Iranian modern petit-bourgeoisie
This section shows the maximum political oscillation in political action. It complains for four years, and reveals its desire for change in any form, ranged from an Imperialist-directed regime change to a revolution, however because of the absence of a powerful alternative tends is tempted to engage in a “safe political action” as the date of the “election” comes nearer. This section does not have illusion about the nature of the ruling factions and views them alike in plundering society but believes it must add fuel to the flame of animosity between the ruling factions to make some profit in the end. This section dreams for an Islamic Gorbachev to lead the system towards removing the so-called non-elective institutes. Even if we stick to this context we can easily understand this is a bubble-like illusion that collapse by mere thinking about it. For this reason, you cannot find no noticeable writing about political strategy among the intellectuals and politicians who represent this section.
            In brief, the “election” survives as first, a practice to distribute power and renew the balance of power within the ruling system, and second, a show of legitimacy. In Iran, with peculiarities of its political structure, this story persists until the emergence of a real alternative.