About Bonapartism

Bonapartism pertains to the Napoleon I, the first French emperor, after the victory of the Great French Revolution (1789-1794). The historic mission of the French Revolution was to topple down feudal system and establish a bourgeois system. Different classes engaged in the revolution with different visions: bourgeoisie, petty- bourgeoisie, peasants and proletariat. There was a competition between these classes. While bourgeoisie tried to limit the revolution’s outcome to the subversion of feudal system, petty-bourgeoisie, peasants and proletariat were willing to radicalize the revolution to realize its slogan “equality and brotherhood”, and this contrasted interests of bourgeoisie that saw in the revolution freeing peasants from the yoke of feudalism to provide labor force for manufactures and expand capitalist system.  The first stage of the French Revolution ends with the overthrow of Jacobins and the execution of Robespierre.  In the second stage, the Thermidor, the left wing of the revolution is pushed back, and the right wing paves the way for the coronation of the Napoleon I. The rule of Napoleon put an end to the revolution and checked its radicalization but at the same time stabilized achievements of the revolution and waged Napoleonic wars against European reaction.

However, the term Bonapartism found a widespread recognition when the Marx used it in his analysis of the aftermath of the 1848 revolution in France. The 1848 revolution overthrew the Louis Philippe, the symbol of financial oligarchy. The revolution brought to power a bloc of diversified political forces. As Marx says: 

“On its side stood the aristocracy of finance, the industrial bourgeoisie, the middle class, the petty bourgeois, the army, the lumpen proletariat organized as the Mobile Guard, the intellectual lights, the clergy, and the rural population.”[1]. The workers’ uprising in 23 and 24 June was brutally demolished and leaders of the riot were arrested. The bourgeoisie’s inability to put an end to revolution paved the way for Louis Bonaparte, a mediocre figure, in Marx’ words. Bonaparte was elected as the French president.  Bonaparte, taking the helm of a government that raised itself above social classes, was not the direct representative of French bourgeoisie. As Marx says: “[bourgeoisie] to preserve its social power intact its political power must be broken… in order to save its purse it must forfeit the crown, and the sword that is to safeguard it must at the same time be hung over its own head as a sword of Damocles”.[2]

Bonpartism, as a product of the fruitless 1848 revolution, continued until the defeat of France in the war with Prussia that led the Paris Commune uprising. The concept of Bonapartism has been used by other authors to describe somewhat different conditions. For instance, Lenin calls Kernesky’s government a Bonapartism one where neither bourgeoisie nor the working class had sufficient might to seize power. Trostky describes the Stalin-led bureaucracy as an instance of Thermidor of the Russian revolution and a Bonapartist state. In analyzing the rise and basis of fascism, August Thalheimer refers to Marx’s concept of Bonpartism.

At any rate, Marx’s Bonapartism shows the dialectic of the class struggle and the various forms of political institutes that may appear in this course, and refutes sticking to mechanical analysis of the relationship between classes under certain conditions.

[1] & [2] The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Napoleon

From where Does the Islamic Revolution Derive its Power?

There has been many comments and analyses concerning the emergence of the Islamic Revolution and system in Iran. Viewing this phenomenon from various angles has revealed its various aspects that have affected the history of at least an important part of the world and generally the whole world. In fact, this even provoked a series of events that integrated into a widespread Islamic political movement.  However, what is important in comprehending this phenomenon is the chain of events that led to the victory of the Revolution in 1979. A review at the history of the clergy organization shows that Shiite clerics have always been in a competition with monarchs for a greater share of power. Their power to mobilize masses has determined this share over the history so that when kings in Safavid and Qajar eras engaged in long wars with neighbors the clerics played a key role in mobilizing and inciting peasantry against Koffars [heretics, unbelievers in Islam]. However, with the Constitutional Revolution (1905-1911), the sunrise of modernization in Iranian society that considerably weakened traditional values, including the values that gave a central indisputable influence to the clergy organization, the power of ayatollahs waned in Iran so that their desire for overcoming power unilaterally reduced and turned into a wish for having a seat beside technocrats, bureaucrats and statesmen. The trend of industrialization marginalized the clergy organization and though they always played some part in social movements but they always humbly tried to disguise themselves as social reformers not professional politicians. Of course, this should not be forgotten that major trends in the clergy organization theoretically believed in the rule of Sharia and the revival of a theocratic rule as was in early Islamic era in seventh century or even the semi-theocratic governments under the Safavid and Ottoman empires.

In this circumstances, when social movements began to spread in Iran in 1970s in Iran, the absence of an organized political party or front placed clerics on the top of a huge voluminous movement, and the clerics who never expected to be welcomed so warmly by the people had to turn to religious and even non-religious intellectuals and technocrats to organize the revolution. From the dawn of the Revolution this bilateral game between the two began. A wide spectrum of intellectuals acted as an intermediate between the clergy organization and masses and without the involvement of these intellectuals the clergy organization could not take the helm of the movement and even acquire the self-confidence and morale to direct the revolution.

What has been not been attended precisely is the chain of events that led to collapse of the former regime and the emergence of the first theocratic regime in the modern time. The chronology of events in last days of the Pahlavi regime will help us understand why a clergy-led faction could monopolize power and even, in next years, challenge the Western world. A review of events on the days just before the overthrow of the monarchy shows all sides, including the clergy organization led by Ayatollah Khomeini, Iranian nationalists and secular intellectuals, foreign players, including the US and Europe, and remnants of the former regime were seeking a compromise to share power. There was no doubt that an organ of compromise should have substituted for the former regime but what would be the nature and composition of such organ was still unknown. There are many facts that support this interpretation. Clerics who feared the radicalization of the movement might give an upper hand to leftists and Mojahedin favored the idea of “brotherhood with the army” and when the people chanting the slogan “the only way to freedom is an armed struggle” clerics in streets tried to silence the people and said “Imam [Ayatollah Khomeini] has not yet called for a jihad [a sacred war to be waged by Muslims to expand Islam]”. Followers of Ayatollah had started secret talks with army commanders and the former Prime Minister Bakhtiar, and an American general had come to gather all parties under one ceiling. Prime Minister Bakhtiar talked about the possibility of a peaceful transition as the “fourth French Republic”. The leadership of the army, which could put a crucial effect on the trend of events, was assigned to a moderate commander, Gen. Gharabaghi. However, the hesitation of army and remnants of the former regime promoted the morale of ayatollahs and encouraged them to seek the lion’s share but they still did not think of the monopolization of the power. Even radical and leftist groups that favored an armed uprising never imagined everything would be over in few days. Keeping their organizations clandestine they planned for a protracted armed struggle for even a decade. The Iranian revolution is a good instance of spontaneity and self-movement, where masses take the street without the order of leaders and change pre-planned schemes. While leaders and rulers were bargaining the people invaded garrison and erected barricades. In an unplanned armed insurrection, while guerrilla organizations added fuel to the flame, the people changed the balance. This can be called an “immature uprising”, independent of the decision of leaders and organizers. The demoralized army resisted for a short time and power fell like a ripen apple in the hands of leaders who did not expect such windfall fortune. This unplanned immature uprising had great political and historical consequences. First, it seriously damaged the military and bureaucratic apparatus of the former pro-Western regime and excluded a pillar, the army and ex-regime’s remnant, from sharing power, and gave an exclusive unrivalled position to Ayatollah Khomeini and his followers and allowed them to address the West with more self-confidence and ignite a new era in the Middle East whose main feature is the unbridled expansion of political Islam. Possibly, if the people did not attack the Eshratabad stronghold and the Air Force base in Tehran suburb on Feb. 10, 1979 Iran would experience a difference path, and the army and pro-Ayatollah forces counterbalanced each other and perhaps the events would not go beyond the control of the West. In Spite of theories of conspiracy that attribute the Iranian revolution and its aftermath to the collusion between Mullahs and the West or the infiltration of former Soviet Union’s agent in the Iranian revolution and so on and so forth this was an immature armed uprising that created a turning point in the history of Iran and the Middle East with consequences that have gone beyond decades. Therefore, casting a deeper look at the events in last days of the former regime and motivation and psychological factors that incited the people to engage in an immature uprising is both interesting and of great importance.